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ABSTRACT: Starting in 1999 a group of papers have appeared in mainstream journals that 
treat of the relation between capitalism and democracy in an eminently Marxian fashion. 
These analyses bear on a number of papers published mainly in S&S, specifically those of 
Castañada, Ellman, Harnacker, Nimtz and Petras. This paper provides résumés of all of 
these works and then sets out the implications of the mainstream papers for the left wing 
ones. It concludes by emphasising the importance for the left of the mainstream results.  
 
I. Introduction. 
Recently a number of papers have appeared in mainstream journals that have 
developed the ideas of Marx in an extremely fruitful way. The intention of this paper is 
to call the attention of the readers of S&S to these papers. Specifically the purpose is to 
briefly set out the arguments and then show how they yield deep insights into issues that 
have been raised in a number of articles that have appeared in this journal and in the 
Cambridge Journal of Economics.  
The mainstream papers generally concern the relation between capitalism and 
democracy. They present theories of the immergence of democracy in Europe and of the 
long run instability of Latin American democratic regimes. They provide insights into 
the issues raised by Nimitz (1999) in S&S about the role of Marx and Engels in the 
democratic break-though in Europe in the 19th century and by Howard and King (2001) 
in the Cambridge Journal of Economics about the antipathy between capitalism and 
democracy. They are also extremely suggestive about the problem of defending Latin 
America against neo-liberalism that has been discussed by Ellner (2004, 2005), 
Casteñada (2005), Harnecker (2005) and Petras (2005), all in S&S.  
This paper is structured as follows: The most important of the mainstream papers are 
the ones by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2000a, 2001). In section II a simplified 
version of one of their models is set out to give the reader the flavour of the formal 
structure of their arguments. In section III the works of Nimtz and of Howard and King 
are first set out along with résumés of the relevant mainstream papers. It is found that 
these papers partially validate the view of the correct political action that Nimtz 
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attributes to Marx and Engels. On the contrary, rather than sustaining the antipathy 
noted by Howard and King, they seem to indicate that it was capitalism that was 
responsible for the development of European democracy. In section IV résumés of the 
positions of Ellner, Casteñada, Harnecker and Petras are given along with one of the 
relevant mainstream paper. According to the latter, the root cause of the neo-liberal 
damage in Latin America is not neo-liberalism itself but rather the extreme inequality of 
the distribution of wealth. In addition, it gives a justification for the Latin American 
authors’ advocacy of socialism in spite of its recent rejection in Europe and even 
provides a glimpse of a surprising solution to the basic problem. Section V concludes by 
emphasising the importance for the left of the mainstream papers.   
 
II. Why is there Democracy in Europe? 
This section presents a simplified formal version of Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
(2000) answer to this question. The development of democracy in Europe during the 
19th century is mysterious. Why did the elite class permit it when it resulted, via taxes, 
in their suffering a considerable redistribution of income? A & R’s answer is that is was 
the only way that the elite class was able to avoid a revolution that would have 
destroyed them. But there is a subtlety. Why could the elite class not have voluntarily 
raised the taxes they paid, as a bribe, and maintained control of the government? A&R 
provide an answer to this question in the form of a game played between the elite class 
and the poor.  
In this game the distribution of the wealth is fixed, but the income distribution may 
be changed by means of taxes. The rich have an income of Y and the poor 0. When the 
situation is bad, that is when there is a revolutionary period, the poor can destroy the 
elite class. This type of period comes along every q years. If the poor do this they will 
have an income of mY in every period from then on, with m<1 because of the cost of 
making a revolution. In A&R the game is played over an infinite horizon but one can 
see the basic idea by supposing that it lasts q periods.  
The game is easily described in terms of the game tree of Figure 1, which represents 
the situation during a revolutionary period. At node 1 the elite class E decide whether 
they will concede sufferance to the poor C or not N. If they decide not to, the action 
moves to node 2 where the elite class decide the tax Tr they will pay to the poor. It is 
assumed that Tr<Y, that is the rich can not pay more than their income as a bribe. The 
action then moves to node 3 where the poor P decide if they will make a revolution R or 
not N. If they do the elite class are destroyed and receive 0 while the poor receive mY  
for the next q  periods, that is qmY. It is assumed that qm>1, that is that the time 
between revolutionary periods is sufficiently long that the inequality is satisfied. If they  
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Figure 1. The Game Tree 
 
decide not to make a revolution N then, in the present period the elite class has Y-Tr 
while the poor receive Tr .  Since the next q-1 periods are not revolutionary ones, the 
elite class pays no bribe and have Y in each of them, while the poor receive 0. Thus the 
payoffs here are qY-Tr  and Tr. 
If at node 1 the elite class decides to concede the right to vote to the poor, the action 
moves to node 4. An important assumption is that once this concession is made it can 
not be taken back. At node 4 the poor, who are the majority, vote that the rich must pay 
a tax Tp . The same thing happens in the next q-1 periods as well. The result is that the 
elite class receive q(Y-Tp) and the poor qTp. All this can be read from the tree. In 
addition it is assumed that the poor cannot completely tax away the income of the elite 
class, that is Y-Tp >0. 
How should the game be played? The method of solution is to start from the last 
move and work backward. Thus start at node 3: the poor will make a revolution unless 
Tr>qmY. Thus, moving back to note 4, the elite class must choose Tr*, the tax they will 
pay, so that Tr*=qmY since this is the minimum bribe that will avoid a revolution. But 
because Tr<Y<qmY since qm>1, they can not choose Tr sufficiently large. This means 
that if the situation arrives at node 2 the elite class cannot avoid a revolution and will 
receive 0. If, on the other hand, the elite class concedes the vote, the situation moves to 
node 4 and the elite class receives q(Y-Tp)>0. Thus the correct choice at node 1 for the 
elite class is to permit democracy.  
Thus, why is it that the elite class cannot pay a bribe and maintain control of the 
government? It is because they cannot commit to pay the bribe during non-
revolutionary periods and they do not have sufficient resources in a revolutionary period 
to compensate the poor for receiving nothing in the long interval between these periods. 
The development of European democracy, according to A&R, rests on this subtle 
argument. 
 
III. Explanations of the Current European Situation. 
Europe can be characterised as having capitalism and not socialism, democracy with 
universal suffrage, and an income distribution that is equitable. Résumés of first the 
Marxist and then the mainstream explanations of this are given, next some comparisons 
are made and finally some conclusions are set out.  
Nimtz (1999) explains how Marx and Engel’s idea of how socialism would come 
about determined their political program. They thought that the proletariat would get the 
right to vote, that they would vote to move to socialism, that this would be resisted with 
force by the capitalists, and that finally socialism would arise from this battle. As a 
consequence, at a political level, M&E pushed tirelessly for the foundation of political 
parties that exclusively represented the workers and for universal suffrage. Nimtz 
emphasises that they were virtually alone in this position since the majority of reformers 
wanted to alleviate the suffering of the workers but were nervous about giving them 
political rights. For this reason Nimtz calls M&E the unsung heroes of the democratic 
break-through.  
With respect to the question of why universal suffrage did not lead to socialism, 
Nimtz notes that both M&E were worried that the workers parties, in pursuit of short 
term goals, would loose sight of socialism as a long term aim. According to Nimtz, after 
their deaths this is what happened, opportunism triumphed. 
Howard and King (2001) also comment on the relation between capitalism and 
democracy but they emphasise the antipathy. Capitalism is dependant on liberal 
property rights. If democracy threatens these, it must be restrained by repression, 
ideological conditioning and constitutional impediments. Thus we have capitalism 
because democracy has been tamed. (See especially pp. 794-5.)  
Turning to the mainstream writers, Galor and Moav (2006) in their paper “Das 
Human Capital” claim that if Marx had understood the concept he would not have 
written Capital and European history would have been different. They start with two 
classes, the capitalists who are rich enough to accumulate and leave inheritances and the 
workers who are not. In addition physical capital is scarce relative to human capital. At 
a certain point it becomes optimal to distribute savings between the accumulation of 
human and physical capital. This is done by having free public education financed by a 
tax on capitalist inheritance which is democratically chosen. As G&M convincingly 
argue, all the capitalists as well as the workers, will vote for the tax which leads to the 
optimal distribution. After this the accumulation of human capital by the workers 
eventually leads, at least in the model, to a completely equal distribution of income. 
The other two authors emphasise the link between capitalism, democracy and income 
distribution. Justman and Gradstein  (1999) provide a structuralist account of the 
gradual extension of suffrage and its effect on the income distribution. Initially the 
franchise was limited to the upper income groups. As income rose, due to the success of 
capitalism, the disenfranchised groups acquired sufficient resources to cause serious 
social unrest. Thus at each juncture, the median voter saw it in his interest to extend the 
franchise in order to reduce these problems. These decisions had two effects: they made 
the democratically chosen tax structure more and more progressive and they insured that 
the income of the new median voter was lower than that of the previous one. This 
process continued until there was universal suffrage and an equitable income 
distribution.  
As noted above, according to A&R there is democracy in Europe today for two 
reasons, a revolution that would have destroyed the elite class was too expensive on the 
one hand and, on the other, the elite class could not muster sufficient resources to bribe 
the workers since they could not guarantee the bribe during non-revolutionary periods. 
In addition to this, A&R (2000a) argue that suffrage had to be universal since going half 
way would have been interpreted as a sign of weakness  and would have involved the 
elite class in, at best, the cost of quelling a revolution.  
The comparison of these views can be organised around the following question: In 
Europe today, why do we have capitalism, not socialism; democracy with universal 
suffrage; and an equitable distribution of income?  
Why capitalism and not socialism? Nimtz: the workers parties succumbed to 
opportunism. H&K: capitalism tamed democracy. A&R: it was cheaper to continue with 
capitalism rather than pay the cost of a revolution.   
Why democracy at all? A&R: it was necessary for the survival of capitalism. J&G: it 
was a mechanism for decisions within the elite class, pressure from the disenfranchised 
caused an extension of the right to vote. 
Why universal franchise? Nimtz: the workers pushed for it. A&R: it was necessary to 
avoid the appearance of weakness and the necessity of trying to quell a revolution. J&G: 
it was the end result of a combination of the logical structure of democracy and pressure 
from the disenfranchised. 
Why an equitable income distribution? A&R: it is necessary to avoid a revolution. J&G: 
it is the natural consequence of the extension of the franchise. G&M: it is intrinsic in 
capitalism. Democracy is useful in coordinating the accumulation of human capital.  
The over all impression that one has from the mainstream writers is that universal 
suffrage democracy is the creation of capitalism. For G&M it is merely a convenient 
way to organise the accumulation of human capital which is intrinsic in capitalist 
development. But for J&G it is the initial prod of the rising capitalist productivity which 
is the key to the extension of the franchise. Finally for A&R democracy is the straight 
forward creation of capitalism as its survival mechanism. Indeed this is in accord with 
the casual observation that throughout history capitalism is the only mode of production 
that is associated with universal suffrage democracy.  
This, to some extent, corresponds to the position that Nimtz attributes to M&E. They 
correctly saw that, given capitalism, universal suffrage would be a potent weapon for 
the workers. What they did not foresee, at least according to the mainstream writers, is 
that the workers would use it, not to bring in socialism but rather to make capitalism 
acceptable. But this is the contrary of the position of H&K: It is not, as they claim, that 
capitalism has tamed democracy, but rather that it is democracy that has tamed 
capitalism.1 
 
IV. Latin American Defence against Neo-liberalism. 
One can define neo-liberalism as a system that allows completely free run to market 
forces without providing any safe guards for groups which may be hurt. Ellner (2004) 
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provided a survey of the ideas of the three Latin American writers on how to defend the 
region against neo-liberalism and in Castañeda (2005), Harnecker (2005) and Petras 
(2005) they replied. In addition Ellner (2005) gave a description of the Chaves regime. 
The preferred solution of these writers would be to move, if necessary by revolution, to 
a socialist organisation with a much smaller role for markets. However, since the 
current hegemonic position of the US makes this move impossible, these writers are 
concerned to find alternative defences: Castañenda advocates political alliances with 
centre parties to accomplish what is possible; Harnecker various forms of governmental 
organisation which demonstrate viable alternatives to neo-liberalism; and Petras leftist 
radical action which takes advantage of the divisions in the capitalist camp. These 
defences are very much aimed at the symptoms of neo-liberalism. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provide an explanation for the instability of 
democratic regimes in Latin America. Their explanation is based on an extension of the 
model presented in section II. In the extended model, when there is a democracy it is 
possible  for the elite class to stage a coup and re-establish a dictatorship. Just as it was 
impossible for the elite class to bribe the poor to avoid a revolution, it may be 
impossible for the democratic regime to lower taxes sufficiently to stop a coup. If coups 
are not feasible at democratically chosen tax levels, the democracy is called 
consolidated, if taxes can be sufficiently lowered it is called semi-consolidated, and if 
they cannot be it is called non-consolidated. The type of democracy is determined by 
the distribution of wealth. If the distribution is quite equal, because of the efficiency 
loss of tax collection, the democratically chosen income tax will only be slightly 
progressive and it will not be worthwhile for the elite class to bear the cost of a coup. 
On the other hand, if the distribution of wealth is very unequal, it will always be in the 
interest of the elite class to stage a coup once a revolutionary period arrives. Two 
conclusions arise from this: First Latin American democracies, unlike the European 
ones, are unstable because the wealth distribution in Latin America is more unequal. 
Second, that a redistribution of wealth in Latin America would serve to stabilise the 
democratic regimes. However A&R extend the model to show formally that the act of 
redistribution may itself lead to a coup.. 
The A&R analysis suggests answers to a number of questions connected with neo-
liberalism in Latin America.  
Why doesn’t democracy protect the poor against neo-liberalism in Latin America? 
I have defined neo-liberalism as allowing complete free play of market forces. In 
Europe the workers are protected by democracy. The implication of A&R’s work is 
that, in Latin America, they are not because democracy is not consolidated there. This is 
actually a theme of the three writers: One of Petras’ complaints (p. 155) is that Lula da 
Silva in Brazil “has signed a pact with the IMF to reduce pensions, wages and social 
programs and set aside a surplus of 4.25% of GNP to meet foreign debt payments ”.The 
surplus is necessary to avoid a currency crisis, but the correct way to fund it would be a 
highly progressive income tax. Of course this is impossible because the Brazilian 
democracy is not consolidated as is even admitted implicitly by the OECD Economic 
Survey (2005 p.15) “policy effort is needed to gradually increase reliance on direct, 
rather than indirect, taxes… including a tax on profits”. Castañeda (quoted by Ellner 
2004 p.14) describes the semi-consolidated nature of Latin American democracy 
succcinctly: “If you go too far, they [the capitalists] will just decamp. Either there will 
be a capital flight, and capitalist flight. They’ll go and live somewhere else; or they’ll 
over throw the government, which they are capable of doing.”. 
Why should one advocate socialism when it has been rejected in Europe? 
History has provided us with a kind of laboratory experiment about the relative merits 
of capitalism and socialism. In 1945 it divided Europe in two camps and allowed us to 
see which functioned better. Initially there was some doubt over the outcome. In (1942 
chap. XIX) Paul Sweezy predicted that capitalism would eventually expire because it 
would not be able to compete with the greater efficiency and social justice of the 
socialist camp. But the fall of the Berlin wall finalised the result of the experiment: 
European capitalism was preferred to socialism. This being the case, the advocates of 
socialism for Latin America have a case to answer.  
But A&R provide a theoretical framework for the answer that was given recently in 
the Cuban parliament by the foreign minister Linares. He noted that if the Cubans chose 
capitalism over socialism it would not transform Cuba into the United States but into 
Guatemala. In terms of the A&R framework, this example shows that, while it may be 
better to live in a capitalist economy with a consolidated democracy, it is better to live 
in a socialist state than a capitalist one without a consolidated democracy.  
How can Latin America be Defended Against Neo-liberalism? 
There are two points: First, according to A&R, Latin America would be safe from neo-
liberalism if it had consolidated democratic regimes and further that this can be 
achieved by a redistribution of the wealth. This provides insights into a number of 
events: The instability during the redistribution is illustrated by the fall of Alende and 
by the attempt to unseat Chaves. The stability of the Cuban government is due to the 
successful redistribution. The revolutionary opportunity branch of Chavism described 
by Ellner (2005) has, as a policy, the redistribution of wealth which will, according to 
A&R, stabilise the government. But all these examples illustrate how problematic any 
attempt at redistribution is. Thus we are far from having a solution, but at least 
identifying the problem is a considerable advance. 
The second point is that a practical solution may be implicit in the analysis. This 
idea, that democracy can be stabilised by an equitable wealth distribution, has appeared 
in the best of the mainstream journals. It may just be a momentary blip, but if it were to 
take root and become the conventional wisdom, it could bring about a basic change in 
American policy. One might say that the two basic values of the society of the United 
States are democracy and private property. Up until now, any program of wealth 
redistribution in Latin America has ignited strong North American resistance as being, 
uniquely, an attack on private property. But if these programs came to be seen as a 
means of stabilising democracy as well, it would introduce an element of ambiguity into 
American policy at the very least. Before one dismisses this as completely impossible, 
one should remember that one of the motives for the immensely expensive American 
intervention in Iraq was to bring democracy to the Middle East.   
 
V. Conclusion. 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to set out the implications of current 
mainstream research for themes that are central to Marxist thinking. I think that they are 
important and provide both new insights and deepening of old ones.  
The second has been, up to this point, only implicit. It is the following: the 
mainstream has powerful techniques which are immensely useful in the analysis of 
issues which are important to us on the left. But a reading of these papers gives the 
impression of a lack of passion, the issues have the appearance of mere intellectual 
puzzles. The second objective of the paper is to appeal to economists on the left to 
familiarise ourselves with this literature and to learn its techniques so that the passion 
can come together with the technical power and understanding of these central issues 
can move forward.  
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